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BallotMaps: Detecting Name Bias
in Alphabetically Ordered Ballot Papers
Jo Wood, Member, IEEE, Donia Badawood, Jason Dykes, and Aidan Slingsby Member, IEEE
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Fig. 1. BallotMap showing electoral success (or otherwise) of each candidate for the three main parties in wards (small rectangles) in
each London borough (grid squares) in the 2010 local government elections. Vertical ordering of candidates within each borough is
by ballot paper position within party (top row first, middle row second, bottom row third). Main parties with three candidates in a ward
are shown. If no ballot ordering bias existed there would be no systematic structure to bar lengths. This ballotMap shows that more
candidates get elected who are listed first within their party than do candidates who are second or third.
Abstract—The relationship between candidates’ position on a ballot paper and vote rank is explored in the case of 5000 candidates
for the UK 2010 local government elections in the Greater London area. This design study uses hierarchical spatially arranged
graphics to represent two locations that affect candidates at very different scales: the geographical areas for which they seek election
and the spatial location of their names on the ballot paper. This approach allows the effect of position bias to be assessed; that is, the
degree to which the position of a candidate’s name on the ballot paper influences the number of votes received by the candidate, and
whether this varies geographically. Results show that position bias was significant enough to influence rank order of candidates, and
in the case of many marginal electoral wards, to influence who was elected to government. Position bias was observed most strongly
for Liberal Democrat candidates but present for all major political parties. Visual analysis of classification of candidate names by
ethnicity suggests that this too had an effect on votes received by candidates, in some cases overcoming alphabetic name bias. The
results found contradict some earlier research suggesting that alphabetic name bias was not sufficiently significant to affect electoral
outcome and add new evidence for the geographic and ethnicity influences on voting behaviour. The visual approach proposed here
can be applied to a wider range of electoral data and the patterns identified and hypotheses derived from them could have significant
implications for the design of ballot papers and the conduct of fair elections.
Index Terms—Voting, election, bias, democracy, governance, treemaps, geovisualization, hierarchy, governance.
1 INTRODUCTION
There has long been a suspicion from candidates standing for election
that the order in which candidate names appear on a ballot paper may,
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in part, influence the number of votes received (e.g. [18]). Despite a
number of studies investigating the degree of this effect [24, 1, 13, 5,
20, 19], evidence appears inconclusive and sometimes contradictory.
This paper considers how information visualization may be designed
and applied to investigating the degree to which some form of name
bias may exist in influencing votes received by candidates.
The overall aims of the work are twofold: to identify the degree
to which the position of candidate name affects numbers of votes
received; and to develop a data visualization design appropriate for
exploring the spatial and non-spatial influences over candidate votes.
Addressing these aims is important because conducting fair and neu-
tral elections is an essential part of the democratic process. The aims
are timely because access to detailed digital electoral results and legis-
lation is becoming increasingly easy (e.g. [4, 6, 15]) and is considered
an important aspect of participatory democratic accountability (e.g.
[7]. In her 2008 position paper addressing the grand challenges of in-
formation visualization, Tamara Munzner called for work in visualiza-
tion that leads to “total political transparency. . . through civilian over-
sight of data on voting records, campaign contributions. . . ” [14]. She
stated that while such data are available in theory, they are in practice
not understandable by the citizens meant to be empowered by them.
This work, while not analysing voting records of politicians, makes
accessible patterns in the voting behaviour that led to their selection
and rejection. We assert that this is an important part of democratic
accountability enabled though good visualization design.
This design study examines results of the Greater London local
elections held on the 6th May 2010. These elections took place in
parallel with the UK general election where members of Parliament
and the national government were elected. Within the Greater Lon-
don area, 6829 candidates were standing for 1842 positions across 614
electoral wards. These wards were in turn aggregated into 32 London
boroughs each of which formed a local government responsible for ad-
ministering local services such as transport and education. Unlike the
national general election, each ward in the local elections studied here
had three electable positions available and voters were permitted to
vote for up to three candidates. All ballots used the ‘first past the post’
system, where the three candidates with the largest number of votes in
each ward were elected. Most candidates stood as part of a political
party slate, and their party affiliation was indicated on the ballot paper.
All candidates for each ward were listed on the ballot paper from top
to bottom in alphabetical order (see sample ballot paper in Fig. 2).
For the purposes of this study, we limited analysis to only those can-
didates from the three major political parties in the UK – the centre-left
Labour Party, the centrist Liberal Democratic Party and the centre-
right Conservative Party. Since these parties provided three candidates
for almost all wards, this allowed us to investigate the effect of name
ordering within parties as well as between parties without the need to
account for an uneven distribution of candidates. Of the total of 6829
candidates, 5973 of them stood for one of the three main parties and
5025 of them were in wards where the main parties offered three can-
didates for election. This sample size of 5025 (74%) was sufficiently
large to allow potential bias in voting behaviour (i.e. influences other
than party preference, or individual candidate characteristics) to be
identified.
We identified four research questions around which we conducted
our visualization design and application:
1. To what extent does the position of a name on a ballot paper
affect the number of votes received by a candidate within their
party?
2. To what extent does the position of a name on a ballot paper
affect the number of votes received by a candidate independently
of their party?
3. How does any name bias vary geographically within the Greater
London area?
4. Does the apparent ethnicity of candidates as indicated by their
name contribute to any name bias?
The challenge in designing an appropriate visual means to explore
these research questions was to deal with two separate scales of spatial
pattern – that of the spatial arrangement of names on the ballot paper
and the hierarchical geospatial arrangement of candidates and voters
in the Greater London area. Together with political party and ethnic-
ity suggested by candidate name these provided four sets of indepen-
dent variables that may have an influence on number of votes received
and who was elected to local government for each of the 5025 can-
didates in the sample. Given the spatial relationships and exploratory
nature of this investigation into the extent of any such patterns, a means
by which alternative visual arrangements of the data could be quickly
constructed was necessary.
CHADWELL
VOTE FOR NO MORE THAN THREE CANDIDATES
Gertrude Chadwell
22 Some St, London N1 2AB
UK Independence Party
2
CROUSE
Justin Crouse
(Address in constituency)
The Labour Party Candidate
3
AARON
Lawrence Aaron
17 Newington Road, London N1 6FG
Liberal Democrats
1
DEBOSE
Joanne Debose
16 Acer Avenue, London NW4 8XT
Green Party
4
HANDY
William Handy
(Address in constituency)
The Labour Party Candidate
5
HOOPER
Malcolm Hooper
(Address in constituency)
The Conservative Party Candidate
6
NOOR
Anjit Noor
(Address in constituency)
The Labour Party Candidate
8
PFEIFFER
Dale Pfeiffer
103 Elephant Way, London NW1 8RH
Liberal Democrats
9
KOZLOWSKI
Michael Kozlowski
(Address in constituency)
The Conservative Party Candidate
7
TALLY
Deborah Tally
(Address in constituency)
The Conservative Party Candidate
10
WHITFIELD
Sarah Whitfield
45 Kingham Place, London N1 6SL
Liberal Democrats
11
YILMAZ
Shaquil Yilmaz
4 Pocklington Walk, London N1 5DS
Independent Candidate
12
Fig. 2. Sample ballot paper from the London May 2010 local election
showing alphabetic arrangement of fictitious candidates on the page.
Each voter can vote for up to three candidates on the ballot paper (order
of preference not indicated).
2 PREVIOUS WORK
The work conducted here was informed by previous studies on both
voting behaviour specifically, and choice selection in general. Kros-
nick proposed the theory of recency and primacy when looking at how
choices are made from a selection when presented sequentially in time
(recency) and in space (primacy) [9]. The primacy effect is expected
when there are number of choices listed vertically; this means that the
first item in the list is the more likely to be chosen than others in the
list. It suggests that an alphabetic ordering of candidate names on a
ballot paper would favour those with names closer to the head of the
alphabet. What is less clear is whether the tendency towards primacy
is sufficiently strong to overcome other preferences expressed in the
voting booth such as knowledge of the candidate’s record, party pref-
erence or other judgements based on the name of the candidate.
Rallings and colleagues analysed English local election results in-
cluding London borough elections between 1991 and 2006 [20, 19].
With regards to the positioning of names, both studies suggested a
statistically significant name ordering effect and concluded that candi-
dates listed first on the ballot paper within their party were more likely
to get more votes than candidates listed second or third. The Electoral
Commission report [24] considered this research and concluded that
while alphabetical discrimination may occur in multi-member elec-
tions, the strength of this effect was not sufficient to suggest it had a
significant outcome on who was elected.
Several other studies around the world support the view that there
may be an effect of name positioning on the ballot paper. For exam-
ple, Lijphart and Pintor analysed the 1982 and 1986 senate elections in
Spain and concluded that the candidate listed higher on the ballot paper
enjoyed a vote advantage over the next candidate from the same party
[11]. Studies in the USA supported this view such as the work of Kop-
pell and Steen who assessed name-ordering effects by rotating names
on a ballot paper so all candidates would occupy the first position once
[8]. They concluded that a candidates performance was much stronger
when listed first on the ballot paper than any other position. A similar
experiment conducted by Ho and Imai who randomized names on a
ballot came to similar conclusions [5].
On the other hand, some studies suggest that the position on the
ballot paper has little or no effect on candidates’ performance [1, 13].
There is also some doubt about the effect of positions other than first
in a candidate list. Pack conducted an analysis of name position effect
on election of candidates within the Liberal Democrat party [18]. He
suggested that being either at the top or bottom of a list might confer a
weak advantage over those listed in the middle when candidates were
selected from a ballot paper with vertical ordering.
What is clear from previous work is that there is evidence for some
degree of advantage to those listed first in a ballot, but neither the
degree of that advantage, nor whether patterns exist for names in other
positions on the ballot are known. We can find no studies that look at
a possible geographic effect, a name ethnicity effect, nor any that use
visualization to explore and communicate these patterns.
3 EXPLORING ALPHABETICAL NAME BIAS
Data on the votes received, borough and ward names, political parties
and names of all candidates who stood in the May 6th 2010 London
local elections were retrieved from the London Data Store [3]. The site
provided by the Greater London Authority (GLA – London’s regional
government) with the stated aim to allow “citizens to be able access
the data that the GLA and other public sector organisations hold, and
to use that data however they see fit – free of charge. . . Raw data often
doesn’t tell you anything until it has been presented in a meaningful
way. We want to encourage the masses of technical talent that we have
in London to transform rows of text and numbers into apps, websites
or mobile products which people can actually find useful” [4].
The data were cleaned, requiring the correction of 20 errors out of
the 6829 candidate records. Errors were identified where vote tallies
did not correspond with the records of elected candidates and where
duplicate records appeared in the database. For these records, the cor-
rect names and vote tallies were found by consulting the relevant local
government source via the web. Ballot paper position for each can-
didate was calculated by performing an alphabetical comparison with
candidates sharing the same ward. The cleaned election data were geo-
referenced by identifying each ward centroid from Ordnance Survey’s
OpenData Boundary-Line dataset [17]. Together these data sources
generated a set of nine primary variables for each candidate (see Ta-
ble 1). Variables were divided into three groups: those relating to
geospatial location; those relating to the candidate name; and those
relating to the votes received by the candidate and their political party.
From these data a further set of six secondary derived variables was
calculated in order to assess the degree of alphabetical name bias (see
Table 2).
The signed chi statistic [25] was calculated to give an indication as
to the variation in votes acquired by candidates relating to issues other
than party affiliation as
χ =
obs− exp√
exp
(1)
where the expected number of votes for each candidate was one third
of the total party votes for their ward (each candidate in the sample
stood in a ward with two other candidates from the same party) and
Table 1. Primary candidate variables extracted from the London Data
Store and OS Boundary-Line datasets
Location Name Votes
Borough name Candidate name # candidate votes
Ward name Alpha position in ballot (1-24) Party
Easting Was elected (y/n)
Northing
Table 2. Secondary derived variables constructed for visual exploration
in HiDE
Name Votes Combined
Alpha position in party (1-3) # party votes Signed chi
% of party vote Residual
Vote order in party (1-3)
the observed value was the actual number of votes received by the can-
didate. Thus positive values of χ indicate that the candidate received
more than the expected number of votes if only political party was
assumed to influence candidate choice, while negative values indicate
fewer than expected votes were received.
The residual measure was designed to identify anomalies that did
not show name ordering bias and was calculated as the difference be-
tween the percentage of party votes received by a candidate and that
expected for an average candidate with the same ‘alpha’ (alphabeti-
cal) position with their party. Thus while the chi statistic assesses the
degree of name order bias, the residual identifies candidates that have
greater or fewer votes than predicted given their party affiliation hav-
ing taken any name order bias into account.
Chi-squared analysis of the numbers of votes received by candi-
dates in each of the alpha positions in their party revealed a significant
ordering effect in excess of the 99% confidence level for within party
variation and 95% level for received votes independent of party. How-
ever, a visual approach was investigated to see how this ordering effect
may vary with respect to some of the other variables in our dataset.
3.1 Hierarchical Visualization
The design challenge was to provide a visual exploration environment
to represent the interrelations between the 15 variables identified in
Tables 1 and 2. Four of those variables had a spatial component (bor-
ough location, ward location, alpha position in ballot and alpha po-
sition in party) while the remaining 11 were non-spatial. Standard
graphical techniques for examining relationships between variables,
such as faceted scatterplots or scatterplot matrices, were not seen as
sufficient for a number of reasons. Firstly, many of the variables
we wished to explore were categorical (boroughs, wards, candidate
names, party, was elected) or comprised a small number of values (al-
pha position within party, vote order within party). These do not lend
themselves to depiction in plots more suited to continuous measure-
ment data. Secondly we wished to be able to compare many variables
simultaneously, requiring sufficient graphical space to use hue and
brightness/saturation color components simultaneously. Point based
symbolisation techniques are not well suited to discriminating use of
color in this way.
While the Greater London area is largely urban, the density of
households varies considerably within the region, and consequently
the size of boroughs varies in order to approximately balance the num-
ber of constituents in each unit (see Fig. 3). Consequently, to aid visu-
alization we used a spatial treemap layout [27] to produce a rectangular
cartogram of the distribution of boroughs and the wards within them.
Here, the graphical area of each borough is fixed (which roughly ap-
proximates its voting population and aids graphical comparison) rather
than reflecting geographical area (which has little bearing on the vot-
ing behaviour). Additionally, we wished to reflect the spatial arrange-
ment of candidate names on the ballot paper in our exploratory graph-
ics. We achieved this by ordering representations of individual can-
didates vertically from top to bottom in the same order in which they
appeared on the ballot paper. By combining with color to reflect the
non-spatial variables we constructed a framework for the creation of
ballotMaps.
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TowerCity
Fig. 3. The 32 London boroughs in the study area. With the exception of
’City’ (not part of the election), boroughs vary in area roughly to equalise
voting population.
Fig. 1 shows an example ballotMap that reflects the geospatial dis-
tribution of wards and spatial distribution of names on the ballot pa-
per. Each large square represents a borough positioned approximately
in relation to its geographic location (northerly boroughs towards the
top of the ballotMap, inner boroughs in the centre etc.) [27]. Each is
divided into three horizontal rectangles showing the three main politi-
cal parties symbolized by hue. The size of each is proportional to the
number of candidates in each party standing for election. Small rectan-
gles represent individual candidates either in a light color if not elected
or darker shade if they were. Candidate rectangles are ordered verti-
cally according to their position on the ballot paper within their party,
so that candidates who were alphabetically first within their party ap-
pear in the top row, second in the middle row and third in the bottom
row. Candidates are ordered from left to right according to electoral
success.
This particular depiction shows some evidence of name bias that
itself is geographically and party related. If electoral success were
based only on party preference and candidate suitability there should
be no relation with ballot paper position. We would therefore expect
the horizontal length of each dark bar to be roughly similar for each
party in each borough; any variation being random. But Fig. 1 clearly
shows a trend towards top bars being longer than middle bars being
longer than lower bars. This is particularly evident in the boroughs
of Islington, Richmond upon Thames, Sutton and Lewisham where
candidates listed first in their party are more likely to be elected than
those second or third. Some boroughs show this effect largely for cer-
tain parties, such as the (blue) Conservatives in Ealing and the (orange)
Liberal Democrats in Brent. A few boroughs appear to show no order-
ing effect, such as Bromley and Croydon and a few others where party
preference dominates the distribution of elected councillors, such as
Newham and Barking and Dagenham.
Given there are 15 possible variables to view and many thousands
of combinations of layout, color, size and order for each, an environ-
ment for rapid exploration of design possibilities was required. To
do this we used HiVE (Hierarchical Visualization Expression [22]) to
encode the visual design options and used HiDE (Hierarchical Data
Explorer [2])1 to implement the encoded designs. This allowed rapid
exploratory design options to be implemented, shared and evaluated.
We regard both the ability to rapidly vary design options and the di-
rect exploration of the data as important and complementary contrib-
utors to effective information visualization. The former, which has
been termed ‘re-expression’ in the cartographic context [21], allows
the adaptation of visual encoding to match the research questions be-
ing investigated [23].
The design of Fig. 1 can be summarised in HiVE as:
sHier(/,$borough,$party,$alphaInParty,
$candidate,$isElected);
sOrder(/,[$x,$y],[NULL,HIER],[NULL,HIER],
[$success,NULL],[HIER,NULL]);
sSize(/,FX,$numCandidates,FX,FX,FX);
sColor(/,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,HIER);
sLayout(/,SF,SF,SF,SF,SF);
After using HiDE to explore many alternative representations of
the data shown in Fig. 1, it became apparent that considering only
who was or was not elected was not sufficient to identify the ex-
tent of possible name order bias. In particular, in wards and bor-
oughs where party loyalty was strong (e.g. Conservative Bromley and
Labour Barking and Dagenham), any possible ordering effect within
parties was being hidden. To investigate these hidden effects, we
used HiDE to construct ballotMaps comparing alpha order of candi-
dates with their rank order by number of votes received regardless
of whether or not they were elected. This allowed us to explore
name ordering effects even in wards with strong party preferences.
In HiDE this simply involved substituting the variable $isElected
with $partyAndVoteOrder (‘Vote order in party (1-3)’ in Ta-
ble 2). The results are shown in Fig. 4.
The name ordering effect can be seen more strongly here, with top
row of most boroughs being significantly darker and more saturated
than the bottom row. Unlike previous studies, this pattern also shows
a significant difference between the vote order of candidates in second
and third alpha position on the ballot. Geographical variation in this
ordering effect is also evident. The southern boroughs tend to show a
lighter lower row than the northern ones, and the effect is particularly
strong for the Liberal Democrats (e.g. Richmond, Sutton, Lambeth).
Towards the east in the traditionally working class region Barking and
Dagenham, where few Liberal Democrat candidates stood for election,
there is little ordering effect for the other two main parties. Because
each party provided three candidates for election here, a strong party
preference results in little opportunity to select candidates by ballot
position. In contrast, the prosperous boroughs west and southwest
of central London show a strong ordering effect for right of center
Conservative candidates (e.g. Kensington and Chelsea, Hammersmith
and Fulham, Richmond upon Thames) where there may be more ten-
dency for voters to split their three votes between Conservative and
Liberal Democrat candidates. Likewise, the less prosperous boroughs
to the east of central London show a strong ordering effect for left
of center Labour candidates (e.g. Lewisham, Tower Hamlets, Hack-
ney, Waltham Forest) where votes may be inclined to split their se-
lection between Labour and the centrist Liberal Democrat candidates.
The proportion of candidates affected by name order is summarised
in Fig. 5, indicating that on average, a candidate listed first in their
party is 6.3 times as likely to get the most votes in their party than
a candidate listed third. The effect is strongest for Liberal Democrat
candidates; a candidate listed first in their party is 8.6 times more likely
to get the most party votes than one listed third.
To identify the degree to which ballot position influences votes re-
ceived, we constructed ballotMaps showing the signed chi values for
each candidate. Fig. 6 shows this for each party. Assuming an ex-
pected value for each candidate of exactly one third of the total votes
1The source code to HiDE is available at code.google.com/p/viztweets. An
application with the voting data and figures used here is available as an adden-
dum to this paper.
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Liberal Democrat Conservative
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Fig. 4. Alpha position within party (vertical position) and voting rank within party for the three main parties in each ward (vertical bars) in each
borough (grid squares). If no name order bias existed, dark and light cells would be randomly distributed in the top, middle and bottom thirds of
each borough. Actual voting data show that darker cells (indicating a candidate most votes within their party) are more common in the upper third
(listed first on the ballot paper within their party) and lighter cells (least votes within party) are more common in the lower third (listed third within
their on the ballot paper).
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Fig. 5. Alpha position and vote order for, all candidates (gray); Labour
candidates (red); Conservative (blue) and Liberal Democrat (orange). If
no name order bias existed, all bars would be about the same length.
for their party in their ward, the chi ballotMap clearly shows the sys-
tematic ordering effect when values sorted graphically from top to bot-
tom by order within party then order on ballot paper. If there was
no ordering effect, we would expect a random distribution of purple
and green cells. By breaking down the distributions by party, it is
also evident that the strongest ordering effect is for Liberal Democrat
candidates (the top and bottom thirds of the central column in Fig. 6
are generally darker green and darker purple than the top and bottom
thirds of the left and right columns representing the other two par-
ties). Labour candidates positioned first in their party show a slightly
stronger ordering effect than Conservative candidates.
One of the benefits of the chi ballotMap is that it is also possible
to identify anomalous candidates who do not appear to be subject to
an alphabetical ordering effect. These appear as purple cells in the
upper third of the ballotMap or green cells in the lower third. Through
interactive query in HiDE we were able to quickly browse the names
of these candidates, which suggest there may be an alternative source
of name-related bias.
4 OTHER SOURCES OF NAME BIAS
Interactive query of anomalous candidate names suggested there might
be an association with the apparent ethnicity implied by the name. Ini-
tially we created tag clouds comprising all names of candidates posi-
tioned first in their party with a negative residual value - that is, those
who received less than the average percentage party vote for candi-
dates positioned first. In order to indicate whether this distribution
of names was systematically different to those of all candidates in al-
pha1 position, we then compared this distribution with tag clouds of
random selections drawn from the alpha1 sample. We borrowed from
the process of graphical inference [26] to compare the observed values
(alpha1 names with negative residuals) with a null hypothesis assum-
ing no structure to anomalies (random samples from alpha1). While
this indicated there might be some degree of ethnicity bias present, we
wished to examine the structure of that bias in more detail.
To investigate possible ethnicity bias, we allocated each candi-
date to a class relating to the likely ethnic origin of their name us-
ing OnoMAP [12, 16]. This classification, evaluated for use in public
health policy [10], compares given and family names to classify each
pair into one of 16 possible OnoMAP ethnic groups. The distribution
33% of party votesFewer than expected More than expected
Fig. 6. Signed chi values for each candidate arranged by party (left to right) and ballot position within party (top to bottom, row by row). The top
third represents candidates ordered first in their party, then ordered by absolute position on the ballot paper; the middle third represents candidate
ordered second within their party etc. If no name order bias existed, purple and green cells would be randomly distributed within the ballotMap.
of candidates using this classification is shown in Table 3. While there
may be some inaccuracy in classification and origin of name does not
necessarily indicate ethnicity of candidate, we felt this was a valid pro-
cess in this instance since we are attempting to measure the effect of
the name itself on voter behaviour, not knowledge of the candidate
directly.
Table 3. OnoMAP ethnicity categories of candidates
OnoMAP category Number of candidates
African 58
Celtic 886
East Asian and Pacific 14
English 3018
European 124
Greek 31
Hispanic 22
International 7
Jewish and Armenian 27
Muslim 489
Nordic 8
Sikh 110
South Asian 204
Unclassified 27
The numbers of candidates in some of the OnoMAP groups were
too small to draw significant conclusions, and there was also a ques-
tion of the discriminating power of voters in being willing or able to
distinguish between certain groups. We therefore chose to group all
candidates into two broad groups – ‘English or Celtic’, comprising the
OnoMAP ‘English’ and OnoMAP ‘Celtic’ groups of names that are
likely to originate in the British Isles, and ’Other Name Origins’, com-
prising all other name origin groups. Fig. 7 shows the chi values for
all candidates broken down by these two super-groups.
The BallotMap shows that there are approximately similar numbers
of candidates from both ethnic super-groups in all alpha positions, but
that name ordering bias is much higher in the ‘English or Celtic’ group.
The ‘other name origins’ group shows many more purple candidates
with fewer votes than expected in the alpha1 position. This suggests
that, for some candidates at least, a propensity not to select a candidate
due to their non British Isles name origin outweighs a propensity to
select them because they are positioned first within their party on the
ballot paper.
To explore whether this effect had any geographical component, we
constructed BallotMaps showing the chi values by ethnic super-group
for each borough (see Fig. 8). The ballotMap shows that the ethnicity
of candidates varies by geography, for example the western boroughs
of Harrow, Brent, Ealing and Hounslow having a higher proportion of
‘other name origin’ candidates compared with southern boroughs of
Richmond, Merton, Sutton, Bromley and Greenwich. All boroughs
show a name bias in the ‘English or Celtic’ supergroup (upper thirds
greener than lower thirds), but in the ‘other name origins’ group, the
pattern is more varied. In many of the outer boroughs, the alpha1 can-
Fig. 7. Signed chi values for candidates arranged by binary classification of name origin and ballot position within party (top to bottom, row by row).
The top third represents candidates ordered first in their party, then ordered by absolute position on the ballot paper; the middle third represents
candidate ordered second within their party etc. Name order bias (tendency for green cells in the upper third and purple in the lower third) is
stronger for ‘English or Celtic’ names than for other names where candidates listed first are not so likely to get more votes than expected.
didates show fewer than expected votes (purple cells in the top left of
the 32 squares representing each borough), for example Brent, Harrow,
Kingston, Sutton, Bromley and Greenwich. In contrast, some of the
inner boroughs with higher numbers of candidates in the ‘other name
origins’ super-group show a name ordering bias within this group that
is similar to or stronger than that seen in the ‘English or Celtic’ group
(e.g. Hackney, Tower Hamlets, Newham).
5 CONCLUSION
The aims of this study were twofold – to identify the degree to which
candidate name influenced votes received in a multi-member elec-
tion, and to consider appropriate information visualization design for
analysing and communicating spatial and non-spatial data on demo-
cratic decision making. Our first aim was broken down into four
research questions. We have shown that ballot position did indeed
strongly influence the number of votes received by candidates in the
most recent local government elections in London and that some of
those who are currently representing London may have benefitted from
this effect just as those who are not suffered from it. The effect was
sufficiently strong to confer first positioned candidates a 6-times ad-
vantage over third positioned candidates in the same party. Visual ex-
ploration revealed for which parties (Liberal Democrats) and in which
locations (southern outer boroughs) this effect was most strong. There
is some evidence that the strength of this effect is sufficient to over-
come voter preference for party, most likely in marginal seats where
voters are prepared to allocate their three votes to more than one party.
This affects the centrist Liberal Democrats most strongly because they
are more likely to receive votes from voters willing to support one of
the other two main parties (fewer voters willing to split their vote be-
tween the right of centre Conservatives and the left of centre Labour
party).
Exceptions to name-ordering bias were identifiable though visual
means and this led to the exploration of influence of apparent ethnic-
ity of choice of candidates by voters. Here, we were able to iden-
tify where ethnicity bias overcame name ordering bias (outer bor-
oughs) and where it reinforced name ordering bias (inner boroughs
with higher proportion ‘other name origin’ candidates).
The results found here warrant further investigation, to see if these
patterns are consistent over time and are reflected in other areas. The
design of BallotMaps provides a framework for doing this. Bal-
lotMaps use consistent layout rules to reflect the micro-scale spatial
arrangement of names on ballot papers and macro-scale geospatial ar-
rangements of political wards. Unlike scatterplots for examining asso-
ciations between variables the graphical space filling character of bal-
lotMaps allow more effective use of colour symbolisation to represent
additional variables. While this is also a characteristic of some other
graphical statistics such as mosaic plots, the freedom to rearrange vari-
ables dynamically within the hiaearchy allows different layout options
to be found more rapidly. Maintaining consistent use of layout and
color symbolisation helps to navigate the large design space suggested
by complex multi-variate public datasets. That design space can be
rapidly explored using the HiVE/HiDE framework, and was found to
be crucial in arriving at layout and symbolisation rules that answered
our research questions directly.
It remains to be seen whether in doing so we have managed to
“transform rows of text and numbers into apps, websites or mobile
products which people can actually find useful” [4], but the resulting
design and approach may lead to Londoners and others questioning
both the alphabetical ordering that prevails on many ballot papers and
their own voting behaviours, perhaps going some small way towards
addressing Munzner’s grand challenge of total political transparency.
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Fig. 8. Signed chi values for each candidate in each borough arranged by binary classification of name origin (‘other name origins’ left, ‘English
or Celtic’ right) and ballot position within party (top to bottom). The degree of name order bias is indicated by the strength of separation of green
(more votes than expected) and purple (fewer votes than expected) cells. This varies by borough and by ethnic origin of candidate names.
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